TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/022591/0225991.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 6.9 KB | 149 lines

                                                                                THE GULF WAR, Page 23

CONSEQUENCES

What If Saddam Pulls Out?


Iraq will emerge with its military substantially defanged, if
not yet completely tamed, but its menacing President might
keep his job

By LISA BEYER -- Reported by Scott MacLeod/Amman and Christopher
Ogden/Washington


    The first word of Iraq's peace proposal last week touched
off rapturous celebrations in Baghdad, expressions of relief
mixed with skepticism from allied troops and burgeoning peace
hopes around the world. At the White House, however, there was
surprise at the move and concern that a hastily arranged
cease-fire might scuttle Washington's goal of neutralizing the
Iraqi military and toppling Saddam Hussein. By attaching
impossible conditions to the proposal, Baghdad ensured that it
would be rejected by the coalition and that hostilities would
continue -- for now. But Saddam may soon find it necessary,
particularly after the start of a ground battle, to make a
serious peace offer that Washington can't refuse. What then?

    The exact shape of a postwar scenario, of course, would
depend on the details of the Iraqi proposal and of the
negotiations that would follow. But it is possible to sketch
the broad outlines. The most significant fact is that Iraq will
emerge from battle with the menacing, bristling war machine
that Saddam built up over the past decade substantially
defanged, if not yet completely tamed. The allies have seen to
that from the first days of the war, knocking out Iraq's
ability, at least for the time being, to produce chemical,
biological and nuclear arms and later obliterating about a
third of its tanks and artillery.

    But has Baghdad's military been weakened enough?
Washington's goal has never been to liquidate Iraq's armed
forces. Rather, the objective was to leave the country with
enough military power to defend against hostile neighbors --
but not so much that it could continue to threaten them. A
rough gauge of where that balance lies can be found in the
military muscle of Iran and Syria, the two heavies that Iraq's
forces must counterweigh. Iran commands 504,000 soldiers, 185
combat aircraft and perhaps 500 tanks. Syria has 404,000
troops, 558 combat planes and 4,000 tanks. Iraq's losses in the
current struggle have pared its hardware roughly to Syria's
level. But since a country that is only defending its territory
generally needs less firepower than its attacker, Iraq's
weaponry could still use considerable trimming, say U.S.
military planners. As for manpower, though it is not known
exactly how many Iraqi soldiers have been killed by allied
bombardments, no one believes that Saddam's forces, once 1
million strong, have yet been drawn down to the levels of the
other regional powers.

    Consequently Iraq's neighbors are far from ready to trust
Saddam again -- even if he withdraws completely from Kuwait.
The gulf states and Saudi Arabia must find better ways of
defending themselves than they had before Aug. 2. One
possibility is that they will offer Egypt financial inducements
to remain in the region as a deterrent force. Cairo sent two
of its crack armored divisions to Saudi Arabia and does not
expect them back in the foreseeable future.

    The Western forces, in contrast, will probably leave the
gulf fairly rapidly. Although Washington may leave some troops
in the region temporarily, a permanent military presence would
probably provoke more political trouble than it would be worth.
It would be preferable if nearly all the non-Arabs were out of
the area before the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca begins
in June, but that timetable is probably unrealistic. Once the
Westerners do leave, United Nations troops, including Arab
units, are likely to provide peacekeeping forces in Kuwait,
though the Western powers will have Kuwait's open invitation
to return if necessary.

    To ensure that Saddam cannot patiently rebuild his military
to its former glory, the U.S. and Britain will seek to maintain
sanctions forbidding the sale to Iraq of weapons and munitions
or the equipment for domestically producing them. Historically
such embargoes have proved very leaky. At the moment, as many
as 110 German firms are under investigation for breaking or
attempting to circumvent the U.N. embargoes against any kind
of trade with Iraq.

    The prospect of a still powerful Iraq would be far less
worrisome if Saddam were not at the helm. His continuation in
power would be a great disappointment to the allies. It is
conceivable that a surrender, however artfully packaged, would
leave Saddam vulnerable to a coup. The euphoria in Baghdad that
initially greeted reports of the pullout offer suggests a high
level of public anxiety over the war. To have been subjected
to such horrific bombings and wind up with nothing to show for
it might be too much for some Iraqis. But the decisive question
is whether it would be too much for the small circle of
officials Saddam allows to get near him.

    Given the sudden political shifts that are commonplace in
the Arab world, it is possible that most of the Arab
governments standing against Saddam may make amends to him
after the war. Two exceptions: Syria's President Hafez Assad,
who has a long-running personal rivalry with Saddam, and the
Emir of Kuwait. At the same time, Jordan's King Hussein and
President Bush are expected to patch things up. Bush still
prefers the King to the more radical regime that would most
likely replace him, while Hussein is eager for renewed financial
assistance from the West and the Saudis.

    Containing Arab resentment over the allied pounding of Iraq
could prove a difficult and delicate task. Above all, it will
require a serious effort -- especially on the part of the U.S.
-- to pursue a settlement of the Palestinian problem. Who will
speak for the Palestinians is a crucial unresolved question.
By allying himself with Saddam, P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat
has made himself more unpalatable than ever to the West; he has
long been anathema to the Israelis. Given Arafat's exploded
credibility, some Western diplomats say their governments might
again look to King Hussein as the Palestinians' spokesman.

    Whoever speaks for the Palestinians will find Israel a
prickly interlocutor. The target of dozens of unprovoked Scud
attacks, the Israelis will be in no mood to compromise and may
use Saddam's continued leadership as yet another excuse to
avoid negotiations. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir put it
bluntly last week: "There can be no peace in the region so long
as Saddam Hussein remains in power." But Shamir has yet to face
the fact that, regardless of Saddam's personal fate, the Middle
East will never achieve a lasting peace until Israelis and
Palestinians are ready to sit down and talk seriously about the
future.